Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules.
Introduction
Interactive democracy aka Liquid Democracy (see e.g., (Behrens, 2017; Brill, 2017) ) is a new approach to voting well suited for low stakes/ high frequency decisions, and easily implemented on the internet (Grandi, 2017 ). An especially successful instance is budgetary participation (Cabannes, 2004) where the stakeholders (citizens, employees of a firm, club members) vote to decide which subset of public projects the community, firm, or club should implement.
We discuss a stylized version of this process in the probabilistic voting model (Fishburn, 1984; Gibbard, 1977) . The guiding principle of our analysis is that the selection of a single (deterministic) public outcome is prima facie unfair: fairness requires compromise, we must select a mixture of several mutually exclusive outcomes. The mixture may come from actual randomization, or the allocation of time-shares, or the distribution of a fixed amount of some resource (e.g., money) over these outcomes. Some typical examples follow.
In reference (Cabannes, 2004) , the city authority must divide funds or staff between several projects (library, sport center, concert hall) taking into account the citizens' wishes. The scheduling of one or several weekly club meetings (gym classes, chess club, study group) must accomodate the time constraints reported by the club members. Or the local public TV, after polling its audience, must divide broadcasting time between different languages, or different types of program (news, sports, movies). In the fair knapsack problem, the server schedules repeatedly jobs of different reported or observed sizes under a capacity constraint, and must pick a (random) serving protocol.
In all these examples, fairness requires to give some share of the public resources to everyone: each club member should have access to some meetings; everyone should enjoy at least some TV programs, etc.. This contrasts with traditional high stakes/low frequency voting contexts, where the first best is to select a single (deterministic) outcome, and randomization over outcomes is only second best.
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We run into the familiar conflict between protecting minorities and submitting to the will of the majority (Young, 1950; Gordon, 1994; Porta, de Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny, 2000) . On the one hand, the larger the support for a public outcome, the bigger should be its share in the final compromise: numbers matter. On the other hand, we must protect minorities with their idiosyncratic preferences for outcomes disliked by the majority. So the club meetings will be more frequent when many members can attend, but nobody will be entirely excluded; the knapsack server will favor short jobs because this increases the number of satisfied customers, but it cannot ignore long jobs entirely; and so on.
We analyze this tradeoff when preferences can be represented in a very simple Facebook-style dichotomous form: each agent likes or dislikes each outcome, and her utility is simply the total share of her likes. Agents in the knapsack problem care only about their expected service time, and in the club example, about the number of meetings they can attend. Though less natural in the public TV and the library funding examples, where they rule out any complementarities between outcomes, dichotomous preferences are still of practical interest because they are easy to elicit.
We discuss the fairness and incentive compatibility properties of three mostly well known social choice rules.
Our results. The Fair Share guarantee principle is central to the fair division literature since the earliest cake division papers (Steinhaus, 1948 ). In our model this is the Individual Fair Share (IFS) axiom: each one of the n agents "owns" a 1/n-th share of decision power, so she can ensure an outcome she likes at least 1/n-th of the time (or with probability at least 1/n). To capture the more subtle ideas that minorities should be protected, and numbers should matter as well, we strengthen IFS to Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), giving to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size: so if 10% of the agents have identical preferences they should like the outcome at least 10% of the time.
Our starting point is the impossibility result in (Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong, 2005) , where our model and the two fairness properties IFS and UFS appear first: no mixing rule can be efficient, incentive compatible in the prior-free sense of Strategyproofness (SP), and meet Unanimous, or even Individual, Fair Share. We introduce new fairness and incentives properties and offer instead possibility results. Three remarkable mixing rules (two of them well known) meet IFS and achieve, loosely speaking, two out of the three goals of efficiency, group fairness (in the sense of UFS or other more demanding properties), and incentive compatibility.
Start with the Egalitarian (EGAL) rule, adapting to our model a celebrated principle of distributive justice. Taking the probability that the selected outcome is liked by agent i as her canonical utility, the rule maximizes first the utility level we can guarantee to all agents; among the corresponding mixtures, it maximizes the utility we can guarantee to all agents but one; and so on. It is efficient and implements IFS, therefore it is not strategyproof, by the above mentioned result. However if public outcomes are non rival but excludable, we can force agents to consume only those outcomes they claim to like, so it becomes more costly to fake a dislike and the strategyproofness is correspondingly weakened. A meeting of the club is such an excludable public outcome: it is easy to exclude from the meeting those who reported they could not attend; broadcasting via cable TV is similarly excludable, not so via aerial broadcasting. The Egalitarian rule is efficient as well as Excludable Strategyproof (EXSP): misreporting one's preferences does not pay, provided an agent is excluded from consuming those public outcomes she reportedly dislikes (Theorem 1). Thus weakening SP to EXSP resolves the impossibility result.
But numbers do not matter to the egalitarian rule: it treats a unanimous group of agents exactly as if it contained a single agent, so the UFS property obviously fails. A related problem is that if I have a clone (another agent with preferences identical to mine), I can simply stay home and nothing will change. The Strict Participation (PART * ) axiom takes care of this disenfranchisement problem by insisting that casting his vote is strictly benefitial to each voter. So the EGAL rule is only appealing if we focus on individual guarantees and are comfortable treating a homogenous group as a single person. This makes sense if the club must offer some important training to its members. But in the budgetary participation or the broadcasting examples, numbers should definitely matter.
The Conditional Utilitarian (CUT) rule is a simple variant of the classic "random dictator". Each agent identifies, among the outcomes he likes, those with the largest support from the other agents: then he spreads the probability (time share) of 1/n uniformly over the outcomes he likes. So the utilitarian concern is conditional upon guaranteeing one's full utility first: charity begins at home. The CUT rule is related to, but much simpler than, the Random Priority (RP) rule averaging outcomes of all deterministic priority rules. Both rules are SP, meet PART * and guarantee UFS. Therefore they are inefficient. But CUT is much easier to compute and strictly more efficient than RP (Theorem 2). In numerical simulations (Section 9) and for relatively small values of n, its inefficiency is consistently low.
Our third rule is the familiar Nash Max Product (NMP) rule picking the mixture maximizing the product of individual utilities. It is efficient and offers much stronger welfare guarantees to groups than UFS. We introduce two requirements, each one a considerable strengthening of UFS, intuitively but not logically related. The Core Fair Share (CFS) property has an incentive flavor in the spirit of cumulative voting (Gordon, 1994; Sawyer and MacRae, 1962) : any group of agents can pool their shares of decision power and object to the proposed mixture z by enforcing another mixture z ′ with a probability proportional to the group size. Core Fair Share rules out any such objection. Finally Average Fair Share (AFS) applies to any coalition with a common liked outcome: the average utility in such a group cannot be smaller than its relative size. In simple examples, AFS limits very effectively the set of acceptable efficient mixtures. Theorem 3 shows that the efficient NMP rule meets PART * , CFS and AFS but fails even EXSP.
The results suggest several challenging open questions about the impossibility frontiers of our model.
Related literature
Budgetary participation is an important new aspect of participative democracy, reviewed in (Cabannes, 2004) . Our model casts this process as a probabilistic voting problem, introduced first by Gibbard (1977) as a way to design non dictatorial strategyproof decision rules. The literature he inspired viewed randomization as a way around the defects of deterministic rules, mostly to allow anonymous and neutral rules, or to circumvent the absence of Condorcet winners (see e.g, Fishburn, 1984; Laffond et al., 1993; Aziz et al., 2017a; Aziz and Stursberg, 2014; Brandl, Brandt, and Seedig, 2016) . But recent work turns its attention to mixtures of outcomes with time-sharing or compromise in mind: see e.g., (Bogomolnaia et al., 2005; Aziz and Stursberg, 2014; Aziz, 2013; Aziz, 2017; Fain, Goel, and Munagala, 2016; Benade, Nath, Procaccia, and Shah, 2017) .
Our works takes direct inspiration from Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong (2002) ; Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) who introduced the model of randomised voting under dichotomous preferences. In the same mathematical model we present several new results about new normative requirements such as participation incentives, a decentralization axiom, weaker forms of strategyproofness, and stronger forms of fairness.
Two of our rules, EGAL and NMP, maximize respectively a familiar social welfare ordering and a classic collective utility function. The EGAL rule is the lead mechanism in the related assignment model with dichotomous preferences in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) . In probabilistic voting, the Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation rule of Aziz and Stursberg (2014) can be seen as an adaptation of the Egalitarian rule.
Recent literature emphasizes that the NMP rule is central to the competitive approach of the fair division of private commodities, whether divisible or indivisible (Caragiannis, Kurokawa, Moulin, Procaccia, Shah, and Wang, 2016; Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskyi, and Yanovskaya, 2017) . We find here a new application of this rule in the public decision making context, closer in spirit to Nash's original bargaining model (Nash, 1950) . Our results are related to those of Fain et al. (2016) , who also propose the NMP rule for budgetary participation, reinterpret this rule as a Lindahl equilibrium, and discuss its computational complexity. They allow for more general preferences than ours (in particular, full-fledged vNM utilities), and show the Core Fair Share property (Corollary 1 Section 2.3) just like in statement i) of our Theorem 3. They do not discuss incentives properties or any alternative rule.
The rules CUT and RP are non welfarist, in that they do not maximize any social welfare ordering. The RP rule is well known (and was discussed in Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) ), and CUT is a fairly simple twist on the random dictator first introduced by Duddy (2015) who noted that it is strategyproof but did not develop its normative appeal.
Fair Share is an early design constraint of decision mechanisms: see the mathematical literature on cake cutting (Steinhaus, 1948) , and on fair division of microeconomic commodities (Moulin, 2003; Varian, 1974; Thomson, 2016) .
The group version of Fair Share captures the ubiquitous "protection of minorities" principle that is formally related to cooperative stability in standard voting. It is also related to the proportional veto principle (Moulin, 1981 (Moulin, , 1982 and motivates practical twists in the rules such as cumulative voting, especially concerned with the protection of ethnic minorities in political elections (Sawyer and MacRae, 1962) , or minority stockholders in corporate governance (Young, 1950; Gordon, 1994; Porta et al., 2000) . See also the same concerns for EU enlargement Hughes and Sasse (2003) . Our fairness notions are closely related to proportional representation axioms in multi-winner voting as well (see e.g., Aziz, Brill, Conitzer, Elkind, Freeman, and Walsh (2017b) ).
Strict Participation has been considered in the deterministic voting model, leading mostly to negative results. Our results complement those of Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) who undertook a formal study of participation incentives in probabilistic voting.
The Model
A generic agent is i ∈ N , and n = |N |. A pure public outcome is a ∈ A, and a mixture of public outcomes is an element z of the simplex ∆(A), interpreted as a lottery over A, a profile of time shares, or shares of other types of resources between the outcomes in A. Both N and A are finite.
A utility function u i = (u ia ) a∈A is an element of {0, 1} A . Agents who dislike all outcomes play no role in any or the rules we discuss, thus we exclude them at once: the domain of preferences is Ω = {0, 1}
A {0}, where 0 = 0 A ; and u ∈ Ω N is a profile of utility functions. In the examples we always represent u as a N ×A matrix filled with 0-s and 1-s, and we use the notation: u S = i∈S u i and u SB = i∈S a∈B u ia for S ⊆ N and B ⊆ A.
A problem M is a triple M = (N, A, u) where u ∈ Ω N . Actual utilities (welfare) at z are written U i = u i · z, and the corresponding utility profile is written
Definition 2 i) A rule F picks one U ∈ Φ(M ) for each problem M ; the mapping f picks the corresponding mixtures:
. Moreover F and f are Anonymous (treat agents symmetrically) and Neutral (treat outcomes symmetrically).
ii) The rule F is efficient if it selects an efficient profile in every problem. For any n the rule is ε(n)-inefficient if a) there exists a problem M of size n and a profile U ∈ Φ(M ) such that F (M ) is ε(n)-inefficient, and b) no smaller number ε ′ (n) meets this property.
A rule is "welfarist" by design, in the sense that it does not distinguish between mixtures resulting in the same utility profile. For instance if two outcomes a, b are "clones" in problem M (liked by exactly the same agents), a rule is oblivious to shifting some weight from a to b.
The efficient pure outcomes in A are easy to recognize: a is efficient if and only if there is no b such that the set of agents liking b is strictly larger than the set liking a. We call such outcomes undominated. In the following example 
outcome e is dominated by d, and the four other outcomes are undominated. However, convex combinations of undominated outcomes may well be inefficient. In the example, any mixture z such that z b , z c are both positive, say z b , z c ≥ α > 0, can be improved by redistributing the weight α to a and to d. That is, z is Pareto inferior to the mixture
Of special interest are those problems where any mixture of undominated pure outcomes is efficient: in the probabilistic interpretation of our model this means that ex post efficiency implies ex ante efficiency. Indeed the four rules we discuss below mix only undominated outcomes, so in such problems their efficiency is guaranteed.
In our first (minor) result, the set of outcomes liked by an agent is called her like-set.
Lemma All mixtures of undominated (pure) outcomes are efficient in problem M in two cases: i) If |A| ≤ 3 and/or |N | ≤ 4; ii) If A can be ordered in such a way that the like-set of every agent is an interval.
Statement i) is proven by Duddy (2015) ; it implies that example (1) has the smallest sizes of A and N for which a combination of undominated outcomes is inefficient.
Proof of statement ii) Fix a problem M as in statement ii). If some outcomes are "clones" (liked by exactly the same set of agents), a class of clones is an interval as well and it is clearly enough to prove the statement for the "decloned" problem where each interval of clones has shrunk to a single outcome. Thus we can assume that our problem has no clones.
Let A * denote the subset of undominated pure outcomes. We fix a mixture z with support in A * (z ∈ ∆(A * )) and assume some other mixture y ∈ ∆(A * ) makes everyone weakly better off than z: we will show y = z, which implies the statement.
We keep in mind that for any two a, b in A * there is some agent i who likes a but not b, because a and b are not clones. Write the ordered set A * as {1, · · · , K} and apply this remark to the first two agents: some agent i likes 1 but not 2, hence i likes only 1 and u i · z ≤ u i · y implies z 1 ≤ y 1 . Some agent j likes 2 but not 3, hence j likes 1, 2 or just 2, so u j · z ≤ u j · y is either z 12 ≤ y 12 or z 2 ≤ y 2 and either way we deduce z 12 ≤ y 12 . Similarly there is some k who likes 3 but not 4, so u k · z ≤ u k · y means that at least one of z 3 , z 23 , and z 123 increases weakly and inequality z 123 ≤ y 123 follows in each case. An obvious induction argument gives
The symmetric argument starting from outcome K gives
and the desired conclusion y = z follows.
Excludable Strategyproofness; the Egalitarian rule
We start with the familiar prior-free incentive compatibility requirement that misreporting one's preferences is never profitable if no agent can coordinate this move with other agents.
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Notation: upon replacing in the profile u the coordinate u i by another u
The simplest strategyproof rule adapts approval voting to our model: it selects only those outcomes liked by the largest number of agents. Write Φ p (M ) for the set of utility profiles implemented by pure outcomes in A:
With the notation avg(Y ) for the uniform average operation on a set Y of utility profiles, we define the
Note that the rule deliberately treats a problem with two identical columns exactly as the reduced problem where only one column remains. The careful reader can check that this defines a rule in the sense of Definition 1, one that is efficient and strategyproof. However UTIL ignores minority opinions entirely so it fails to address the normative concerns described in the Introduction.
If an agent gets a fair 1/n-th share of total decision power, she will use it on an outcome she likes. We take the following lower bound on individual welfare as the first test that mixing is fair:
The main result of Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) is that a rule cannot be together Efficient, Strategyproof, and meet the Individual Fair Share. Our first result is that this impossibility disappears if we weaken SP as explained below. To motivate this weakening, we adapt to our model the extremely familiar idea of equalizing individual utilities while respecting efficiency.
The lexicographic ordering in [0, 1] {1,··· ,n} maximizes the first coordinate, and when this is not decisive, the second one, and so on. For a utility profile Egalitarian rule (EGAL):
This maximization yields a unique and efficient utility profile (see e. g., Lemma 1.1 in (Moulin, 1988) ). Anonymity and Neutrality are clear. To check Individual fair Share, pick for each agent i a pure outcome a i she likes, and observe that the uniform average of the a i -s ensures utility at least 1/n to each agent: therefore the egalitarian profile U eg must have U eg * 1 ≥ 1/n. Here is the simplest problem where the rule EGAL is vulnerable to a misreport of preferences:
At the true profile u outcome a is dominated and EGAL mixes b and c, z = (0,
2 ). After the misreport by agent 1, outcome a no longer appears dominated and EGAL mixes equally the three outcomes, z = ( ). Agent 1's utility raises from 1/2 at z to 2/3 at u, because he can enjoy outcome b despite pretending not to. The latter is avoidable if the public outcome are excludable: based on reported preferences, the mechanism excludes agents from consuming outcomes they claim to dislike. Recall the discussion of this possibility in the examples of Section 1.
The following incentives property, where we use the notation u i ∧ u ′ i for the coordinate-wise minimum of the two utility functions, captures the resulting weaker incentive compatibility requirement:
To make this definition more explicit, we identify the true utility u i by its likeset L i = {a ∈ A|u ia = 1}, and partition it as
It is useful to decompose EXSP in two statements. In the first one agent i misreports only by inflating her like-set (L i = L 0 i ):
and in the second one, only by decreasing this set (L + i = ∅):
That EXSP equals the combination of SP + and SP − is clear by applying first SP
Similarly SP is the combination of SP + and SP * :
and the above example shows that EGAL violates SP * .
Theorem 1
The Egalitarian rule is Efficient, Excludable Strategyproof, and guarantees Individual Fair Shares.
Proof Preliminary notation and remarks: If
Fix a problem M = (N, A, u). For any M ⊆ N and convex compact C ⊆ ∆(A) the projection on M of the set of feasible utility profiles Φ(C) = {U = u·z|z ∈ C} is convex and compact, so it admits a unique leximin optimal element that we write
This extends the domain of the mapping F eg , and note that we abuse notation by keeping u instead of its restriction to M × A.
Recall the algorithm defining U = F eg (M, C, u). Start with
Write N 1 for the set of agents achieving this minimum, P 1 = N N 1 , and
We stop if N 1 = N , otherwise we set U * 2 = max z∈C 1 min j∈P 1 {u j · z}. We let N 2 be the set of agents achieving U * 2 , P 2 = N (N 1 ∪ N 2 ), and C 2 the subset of C 1 achieving U * 2 in N 2 ; we stop if P 2 = ∅, otherwise we set U * 3 = max z∈C 2 min j∈P 2 {u j · z}, and so on. We end up with a partition N = ∪ K k=1 N k such that U i equals U * k whenever i ∈ N k . Turning to the proof of statement i), we saw that it is enough to show separately SP − and SP + . Fix an arbitrary M = (N, A, u). An agent who likes all outcomes, u i = 1, cannot benefit from any misreport; pick now i ∈ N such that u ia = 0 for at least one a, and a profile u identical to u for all j ∈ N i and such that u i u i (so at least one 0 in u i is changed to a 1). Let U = F eg (N, A, u) and U = F eg (N, A, u) be implemented respectively by some lotteries z and z. We prove successively:
The first inequality implies SP − (when i with true U i reports U i ), the second gives SP + (when i with true U i reports U i ). We clearly have U leximin U , in particular U * 1 ≥ U * 1 : this proves (2) if U i = U * 1 . Assume for the rest of the proof U i = U * ℓ where ℓ ≥ 2. We check first U * 1 = U * 1 . If U * 1 > U * 1 we pick ε ∈]0, 1], and note that the mixture
) and then z ′ guarantees exactly U * 1 to a smaller set of agents than z, and strictly more to all others. This implies that u ·z ′ leximin-dominates u ·z, contradiction. Similarly the strict inclusion N 1 N 1 would imply that the vector U is strictly leximin-dominated by U , which we saw is not true.
So far we have shown that the maxi-minimization of feasible utilities -the first step in the algorithm defining the leximin solution-gives at u and u identical values U * 1 and U * 1 , and identical sets N 1 and N 1 . Now the second step of the algorithms, delivering U * 2 , U * 2 , and N 2 , N 2 , is the same maxi-minimization problem applied in both cases to
Mimicking the above proof we deduce that, if
and finally (2) is now clear.
To prove (3) we compare the profiles u · z and u · z. We just saw that they coincide on N P ℓ−1 = ∪ ℓ−1 k=1 N k , and that if a mixture guarantees utility U * k to all agents in N k for k = 1, · · · , ℓ − 1, it cannot guarantee (at u) more than U * ℓ to all agents in P ℓ−1 : z and z are two such lotteries, so if u i · z > u i · z = U * ℓ , there is some j ∈ P ℓ−1 for whom u j · z < U * ℓ . But U * ℓ ≥ U * ℓ (because U weakly leximin-dominates U ) and u j · z = u j · z ≥ U * ℓ , thus we reach a contradiction.
Strict Participation and Unanimous Fair Share
A striking feature of the Egalitarian rule is Clone Invariance: if at least one voter who shares my preferences does vote, adding my own vote will not change the resulting mixture. This holds because, fixing an agent i, the leximin ordering compares two utility profiles U and U ′ in the same way as U and U ′ , where from V to V we add an (n + 1)-th coordinate repeating V i . Thus the rule is oblivious to the size of support for a particular preference, an unpalatable feature in all the examples discussed in the introduction.
We now define two requirements capturing, each in a different way, the concern that numbers should matter. The first one is an incentive property.
Given a problem M and agent i, define M (−i) = (N i, A, u −i ) and
The violation of Participation is commonly called the No Show Paradox (Fishburn and Brams, 1983 ): a voter is better off abstaining to go to the polls. In the context of budgetary participation, we want more: everyone should have a strict incentive to show up, lest many agents, feeling disenfranchised, will stay home or put a blank ballot, and the result of the vote will not give an accurate picture of the opinion profile.
Strict Participation (PART * ):
Under dichotomous preferences that we consider, strong SD-participation and SD-participation as studied by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) The second axiom, in the spirit of cumulative voting, allows groups of agents with identical preferences to pool their respective shares of decision power. This leads to the following strengthening of IFS, where we set again U = F (M ):
In the statement of UFS the unanimous group S can be a minority or a majority. However unanimous preferences are much more likely in small than large groups, so this property will be more relevant in practice to minorities.
All three rules discussed in the next two sections meet Strict Participation and Unanimous Fair Share. Thus they cannot be both efficient and strategyproof. We start with two strategyproof rules.
6 Incentive compatibility and Fairness; the Conditional Utilitarian rule
We introduce two rules adapting to our model the familiar random dictator mechanism (see Gibbard (1977) ). The difficulty is the treatment of indifferences: if I can dictate the outcome for a 1/n-th share of the time, how should I choose in my like-set ? The first rule, introduced by Duddy (2015) , applies a simple utilitarian test: I focus on the outcomes liked by the largest number of other agents. Consider the set Φ p (M ; i) = {U ∈ Φ p (M )|U i = 1} of all the utility profiles corresponding to the like-set of agent i. Each agent spreads her share 1 n equally between the profiles in Φ p (M ; i) with maximal support:
Conditional Utilitarian (CUT) rule:
Remark 1. Our definition of the domain Ω allows for agents who like all outcomes, u i = 1
A . The presence of such agents is of no consequence for the rules UTIL, EGAL, RP and NMP, but it does impact the mixture selected by the CUT rule, as such agents put their weight on the utilitarian outcomes (those with largest support). Suppose we choose to exclude those agents in the definition of the CUT rule: this will not affect the incentives and fairness properties of the rule identified below, nor its Decentralization property in Section 8.
The next rule uses a familiar hierarchical rule to resolve indifferences, that plays a critical role in probabilistic voting ( (Aziz, Brandt, and Brill, 2013) ), as well as for assigning indivisible private goods ( (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998) , (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) ). Let Θ(N ) be the set of strict orderings σ of N . For any σ ∈ Θ(N ) the σ-Priority rule F σ guarantees full utility to agent σ(1); next to agent σ(2) as well if 1 and 2 like a common outcome, else σ(2) is deemed irrelevant; next to agent σ(3) if she likes an outcome that all relevant agents before her like, else she is irrelevant; and so on.
Random Priority rule (RP)
If mixtures in ∆(A) represent lotteries, the RP rule picks an ordering σ with uniform probability and computes U σ . But in other interpretations, time shares or the distribution of other resources, this simple implementation is not available. We retain nevertheless the intuitive probabilistic terminology.
After checking that both rules are incentive compatible and fair, we compare them from the efficiency angle, and recap our discussion in Theorem 2 below.
Clearly each σ-Priority rule F σ is strategyproof, and SP is preserved by convex combinations, thus RP is strategyproof as well. Checking PART * is equally easy: to each ordering σ of N i we associate the n orderings σ of N where i can have any rank from first to last: agent i is weakly better off at
, strictly so if he is gets utility 0 in F σ (M (−i)); thus the only case where i does not strictly benefit by showing up is when he gets utility 1 in F rp (M (−i)). For UFS, it is enough to observe that a member of coalition S is first in σ with probability i at all, she may do so now, in which case some weight will be taken uniformly from the set she was loading before: this cannot benefit i strictly.
Check PART * . Fix a problem M , an agent i, and for every j ∈ N i let B j be the set of outcomes agent j loads in problem M (−i). Set
Before participating agent i's utility was 1
After i shows up every j in N + loads only B j ∩ L i , and agents in N − may give some of their load to L i therefore i's utility is at least
proves PART. And both inequalities are equalities if and only if each λ j = 1 and |N + | = n − 1 ⇔ N + = N i; the latter implies that i's utility is already 1 in M (−i).
Example (1) above shows that both RP and CUT are inefficient. Under the CUT rule agents 1, 2 and 5 load only d, while agent 3 spreads his load between a and b, and agent 4 between a and c, resulting in the mixture z cut = ( The reverse situation cannot happen: the RP mixture never Pareto dominates the CUT one. This follows because in all problems, total utility under RP is at most that under CUT:
cut is the uniform average of profiles U (i) maximizing total utility in Φ p (M ; i), and for each ordering σ where i is first, the corresponding profile U σ is in Φ p (M ; i) as well.
4
We prove finally that the CUT rule is efficient more often than RP : whenever RP picks an efficient mixture, so does CUT. Observe first that both rules only give weight to undominated pure outcomes. In the case of RP every such outcome a has a positive weight, because it is selected whenever the set of agents who like a has the highest priority. Thus the support of the RP mixture is exactly the set of all undominated columns. Therefore RP selects an efficient mixture if and only if all mixtures with support in this set are efficient as well. The claim follows because the CUT rule is also a combination of undominated columns.
The next result adds to the discussion above some worst case computations reinforcing the strong efficiency advantage of CUT over RP.
Theorem 2 i) Both rules CUT and RP are strategyproof and meet Strict Participation and Unanimity Fair Share. ii) Total utility at the CUT mixture is never below that at the RP mixture, and the former may Pareto dominate the latter. If RP picks an efficient mixture at some problem M , so does CUT.
iii) The CUT rule is ε cut (n)-efficient with ε cut (n) = O(n −   1 3 ) and for all n ≥ 5 we have
The RP rule is ε rp (n)-efficient with ε rp (n) ≤ O( ln(n) n ). iv) The CUT mixture is computed in time polynomial in n + |A|; computing the RP rule is #P-complete in n + |A|.
Recall from the Lemma in Section 3 that both CUT and RP are efficient if n ≤ 4. For small values of n, the lower bound (5) implies a high guaranteed efficiency of CUT, a lower bound on ε cut (n), and the computations in Step 2 of the proof below yield a much smaller worst case efficiency of RP, an upper bound on ε rp (n): n 6 8 12 32 64 1024 16384 ε cut ≥ 91% 87% 82% 68% 58% 27% 11% ε rp ≤ 83% 72% 64% 40% 24% 3% 0.12%
Together statements ii) to iv) make a very strong case that in our model the CUT rule is a much more efficient interpretation of the random dictator idea than RP.
Proof of statement iii) (Statement iv) is explained in Section 9)
4 A consequence of this remark is that CUT and RP pick the same utility profile at problem M if and only if all undominated outcomes of M are liked by the same number of agents.
Step 1 Worst case inefficiency of CUT
Step 1.a: We construct a problem with large n where the CUT profile is O(n − 1 3 ) inefficient. We fix N of size n, a partition N = N 1 ∪ N 2 , and an integer p such that p < n 1 , n 2 and n 1 divides (p − 1)n 2 where n i = |N i |, i = 1, 2.
Problem M has 2n 2 + 1 outcomes labeled as A = {a} ∪ B ∪ C, where B = {b j , j ∈ N 2 } and C = {c j , j ∈ N 2 }. Setting (p − 1)n 2 = qn 1 , each agent i ∈ N 1 likes a, exactly q outcomes in B, and none in C; and each j ∈ N 2 dislikes a, likes only outcome b j in B, and exactly p − 1 outcomes in C. Moreover the problem is symmetric in N 1 and in N 2 , which can be achieved by arranging cyclically the like-sets of the N 1 agents in B and the like-sets of the N 2 agents in C. Here is an example with n 1 = n 2 = 5, p = 4 and q = 3, and the top five agents form Note that each outcome b j is liked by exactly p agents, all but one of them in N 1 , and each c j is liked by exactly p − 1 agents, all in N 2 . Under the CUT rule, each agent i ∈ N 1 loads only a because n 1 > p, so z a = n1 n , and each j ∈ N 2 loads only b j so z bj = 1 n ; there is no weight on C. Total utility in each group is
and by the symmetries these are equally shared in N 1 and N 2 respectively. Now consider the mixture z
3n2 for all j ∈ N 2 , and zero weight on B, resulting in the total utilities
again equally shared in each N i .
For n large enough we can pick n 1 and p such that n 1 ≃ n 2 3 and p − 1 ≃ n 1 3
(if n is a cube these values are exact and q = n and completes the proof of Step 1.a.
Step 1.b. For an arbitrary problem M we give an upper-bound of the inefficiency of the CUT mixture.
We fix a problem M and partition the agents according to their scores max U∈Φ p (M;i) U N , i.e., the utilitarian score of the outcomes on which they spread their weight under the CUT rule. Let p 1 > p 2 > · · · > p K > 0 be the sequence of such scores and N k the subset of agents who load outcomes with score p k . Note that n 1 ≥ p 1 . Set A k to be the set of outcomes loaded by at least one agent in N k : they all have the same score p k so the A k -s are pairwise disjoint. Note also that agents in N k do not like any outcome in A ℓ for ℓ < k.
Consider finally the outcomes b in B = A (∪ K 1 A k ), if any. Their utilitarian score u N b is at most p 1 − 1. We partition B by gathering in B k all the outcomes with a score in [p k+1 , p k ], with the convention p K+1 = 0. Therefore the agents in N k do not like any outcome in B ℓ for ℓ < k.
We prove first that for any feasible profile U ∈ Φ(M ), we can find convex weights π 1 , · · · , π K such that
Pick z ∈ ∆(A) implementing U and write for simplicity
Combining the above equality and inequality we have for all k
are indeed convex and satisfy (6). Next we evaluate the blocks of the profile U cut in the same fashion. Agents in
and then as above we get
Assume now the profile U cut is ε-efficient: U cut ≤ εU for some feasible U . From (6) we find convex weights π such that U
The key inequality is
Combining these two observations we have for any ℓ ≥ 2:
We invoke now the inequality
, for any α > 0, that we apply to each α = p ℓ , ℓ ≥ 2, and combine with the two inequalities above as well as θ
Finally the term
decreases in p 1 and we know p 1 ≤ n 1 , so we get
It remains to compute the minimum of the above expression for fixed n and variable n 1 ∈ [1, n]. With the real variable x instead of n 1 the right hand term and its derivative are
). therefore x = n 2 3 achieves the minimum and we compute
. which is inequality (5).
Step 2: Lower bounding the worst case inefficiency of RP Fix N and integers k, d, ℓ such that n = kd and 2 ≤ ℓ < k. Fix a partition
of N where each subset contains k agents. This construction requires n ≥ 6 and is not feasible for all n.
We consider the problem with A = D ∪ C where D = {1, · · · , d} and each δ ∈ D is liked exactly by the k agents in N δ ; also |C| = n ℓ and each outcome in C is liked exactly by a different subset of ℓ agents.
The symmetric (egalitarian) and efficient outcome is the uniform distribution in D and yields the utility profile U * i = 1 d for all i. We compute now the symmetric profile U implemented by RP.
Fix an ordering σ ∈ Θ(N ) and let L be the set of its ℓ highest priority agents. In the resulting profile U σ , the first ℓ agents have full utility (because there is a ∈ C where they all do). Two cases arise. In the favourable case L is contained in some set N δ : then δ is the only efficient pure outcome liked by all agents in L, thus it must be chosen by the σ-priority rule and U σ N = k. In the unfavourable case L straddles two or more sets N δ and there is only one outcome (in C) that everyone in L like, so that U σ N = ℓ. Therefore
For the asymptotic statement we use the inequality (
Then we choose k ≃ n e and ℓ ≃ ln(n) so that (
is obtained by numerical estimations of (7), omitted for brevity.
Remark 2 The proof of Step 2 improves upon, with a similar proof technique, Example 1 in (Bogomolnaia et al., 2002) establishing that RP is 2 √ n inefficient.
7 Efficiency and Fairness; the Nash Max Product rule
Our last rule of interest is a familiar compromise between the Utilitarian and Egalitarian rules:
This rule is well defined because it solves a strictly convex program, and obviously efficient.
Recall that Unanimity Fair Share offers welfare guarantees only to coalitions of agents with identical preferences (clones). The first of our two new "Fair Share" axioms applies, much more generally, to any group who can find at least one outcome that everyone likes:
The next property conveys the idea that, as each agent is endowed with 1/n-th of total decision power, any coalition of size s can cumulate these shares and impose that a mixture of their choice be chosen with probability at least s n :
This is a familiar core stability property. That UFS follows from either AFS or CFS is clear because we only consider anonymous rules. Applying CFS to S = N implies that the rule is efficient, therefore neither the CUT or the RP rule meets CFS. In the example (1) it happens that the AFS property selects uniquely the Nash mixture, 6 therefore CUT and RP fail AFS as well.
We illustrate the bite of AFS in the following example ii) The NMP rule is not Excludable Strategyproof.
Proof
Step 1: We prove AFS and CFS.
The separation inequality capturing the optimality of the Nash utility profile U * = F nsh (M ) at problem M writes as follows:
Fix S ⊆ N and combine (8) with Cauchy's inequality as follows
The AFS property follows, because if there is some a ∈ A such that u ia = 1 for all i ∈ S, the maximum on the right hand side is |S| 2 . To check CFS we assume there is a mixture z such that U * i ≤ |S| n (u i · z) for all i ∈ S and use again (8) to compute:
Step 2 : We check PART * . In a preliminary result we fix S ⊂ R N + convex and compact, and write S(−1) for its projection on R N 1 + . Define
Inequality U * 1 < U 1 brings a contradiction as follows
Assume next U * 1 = U 1 . The right hand inequality above becomes an equality, so we get i∈N ln(U i ) = i∈N ln(U * i ) and finally U = U * . Summing up, we have just proven:
Applying (10) 
) gives U 1 = U 1 (−1) and U the second we can assume that any two columns of u are different, for if two columns are identical one of them can be eliminated as a redundant outcome. Also recall that no row of u is null.
Because U * i > 0 for all i, the statement is true if U 1 = 0. We assume now 0 < U * 1 = U 1 < 1 and derive a contradiction. Property (10) implies U * = U , therefore there is some z ∈ ∆(A) solving both problems:
As 0 < U * 1 < 1 the mixture z cannot be deterministic, moreover there exists two outcomes a, b in the support [z] of z such that u 1a = 1, u 1b = 0. Writing N (x; y) for the set of agents in N who like x and dislike y, this means 1 ∈ N (a; b) .
Note that N (b; a) must contain at least one i ∈ N 1: otherwise the column U a dominates column U b (outcome b is Pareto inferior to a) which contradicts the efficiency of z in M . We claim that N (a; b) as well contains some j ∈ N 1: suppose not, then the restriction of column U b to N 1 either dominates the corresponding restriction of U a , or these two restricted columns are equal; the former case contradicts efficiency of z in M (−1), the latter contradicts its efficiency in M .
We have shown that N (a; b) and N (b; a) both contains at least one outcome in N 1. Recalling that z a , z b are both positive, we define z(ε) by shifting the weight ε from a to b: this outcome is well defined for ε small enough and of arbitrary sign; such a shift does not affect agents outside N (a; b)∪N (b; a). From z ∈ f nsh (M ( − 1)) we see that the strictly concave function
reaches its maximum at ε = 0. And z ∈ f nsh (M ) implies that the function ϕ(ε) + ln(u 1 · z(ε)) is also maximal at ε = 0: this is a contradiction because ln(u 1 · z(ε)) decreases strictly in ε.
The proof that the NMP rule fails EXSP is more involved and relegated to the Appendix. There we construct an example with |A| = 4 and n = 860 where it violates the SP + property. We also report a computer generated example with 36 agents proving the same point. This prompts the following open question: what are the smallest sizes of |N |, |A| ensuring that NMP violates EXSP ?
Remark 3. Another version of the group fair share requirement is proposed by Bogomolnaia et al. (2002) . The same concept was independently proposed by Duddy (2015) who referred to simply as proportional share (Duddy, 2015) . For the sake of consistency with our other notions, we will refer to it as Group Fair Share(GFS).
Writing u * S for the maximum of all utility functions in S (u * S a = max i∈S u ia ), this condition is
It is clearly stronger than UFS, but strictly weaker than CFS. Both CUT and RP satisfy GFS.
Remark 4. It has been mentioned as an open problem, in the more general voting model with vNM-preferences, whether there exists some rule that satisfies Very Strong Stochastic Dominance Participation and Stochastic Dominance Efficiency for weak orders (Brandl et al., 2015; Brandt, 2017) . Because NMP satisfies both Strict Participation and Efficiency, we see that this question is resolved at least for the case of dichotomous preferences.
Decentralization
We introduce a Decentralization (DEC) property for polarized societies. Say the agents and the deterministic outcomes are color-coded with the same set of colors: we call a profile of preferences polarized if each agent only likes outcomes of his own color. The requirement is that if I am red, the number of green agents will matter to me but not their preferences inside green outcomes. This natural independence property adds to the appeal of the NMP rule, but also of the CUT and RP rules.
Consider a problem M = (N, A, u) and two partitions Γ = (N k )
of N and A respectively. We call this problem polarized along the partitions Γ, Λ if u ia = 0 whenever i ∈ N k , a ∈ A k , and
We write Π(Γ, Λ) the set of polarized problems.
Decentralization (DEC): for any Γ, Λ and k
Combined with the UFS property, this implies that in a polarized problem, each colored subset N k chooses the distribution in ∆(A k ) as if other colors were not present, then the selected outcome in f (M k ) is weighted down in proportion of the size of N k . Proposition The Nash, Conditional Utilitarian, and Random Priority rules meet Decentralization. Moreover for any polarized problem M ∈ Π(Γ, Λ) they satisfy
where the profile F (M k ) is filled with zeros outside M k .
Check that the Utilitarian and Egalitarian rules violate DEC. Consider the two polarized problems along the partition {1} ∪ (2, 3}: 
Proof of Proposition
Step 1. NMP meets DEC
We prove it for two partitions Γ = (N 1 , N 2 ) and Λ = (A 1 , A 2 ) as the general case with arbitrary K is just as easy. We fix a problem M ∈ Π(Γ, Λ) with the two subproblems
there is no null row in u k because there is none in the grand matrix u. Let z * ∈ f N (M ) be (one of) NMP's choice in M . By IFS both weights z * A1 = λ 1 and z * A2 = λ 2 are strictly positive (and sum to 1). By definition (12) the restriction z
Changing the variables z to z = 1 λ k z, we see that
It is now clear that the optimal choice of λ 1 , λ 2 is (λ 1 , λ 2 ) = arg max λ1+λ2=1 {n 1 ln λ 1 + n 2 ln λ 2 } = ( n 1 n , n 2 n ).
In particular λ depends only on the sizes of the partition sets, and
Step 2 CUT and RP meet DEC Fix M ∈ Π(Γ, Λ) some k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K and some i ∈ N k . Under the CUT rule only the agents in N k will load the outcomes that i likes, and they will do it exactly as in the problem M k , except that each j ∈ N k will spread a total weight of 1 n instead of 1 n k . This implies (11). The proof for RP is just as easy.
Computation
In this section we first discuss the computational aspects of the rules we have considered in the paper. We then report on some experiments where we examined the utilitarian performance of the four rules, which in turn gives a lower bound on their efficiency.
Computational complexity
The CUT rule is the easiest to compute of the four. In the like-set of each agent we simply need to identify those liked by the largest number of other agents.
For EGAL, the outcome can be computed in polynomial-time by solving at most n+1 linear programs each with |A| variables. The algorithm was presented by Aziz and Stursberg (2014) .
The RP outcome is #P-complete to compute even under dichotomous preferences . Therefore unless P=NP, it is unlikely that there exists an efficient algorithm for computing the RP outcome. For RP, it is even open whether there exists an FPRAS (Fully Polynomial-time Approximation Scheme) for computing the outcome shares/probabilities.
As for NMP, in contrast to RP, an approximate solution can be computed relatively fast by using general optimisation packages and solvers. The problem is to maximize a convex objective i∈N log(u i · z) where z is a feasible mixture. Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) discussed some standard approaches to approximate the solution.
Experiments
We ran some experiments for small numbers of agents and outcomes. It is difficult to evaluate in a given problem the degree of inefficiency of a given mixture z as in Definition 1, iii). However the ratio of utilitarian welfare at z to the maximum utilitarian welfare gives a lower bound on ε, and it is much easier to compute.
For each combination of n and |A| in {3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20} and for each rule, we examined under the impartial culture (1) the minimum of this ratio and (2) its average. The results are listed in Tables 1-8 . For RP, we did not run the experiments for n = 15 and 20 because the computation becomes very slow. This illustrates the computational infeasibility of RP when we want the exact mixture, even for a relatively modest number of agents.
As the number of agents increase, the ratios start to get worse. But for a fixed number of agents, the ratios do not necessarily get worse as we increase the number of alternatives. We note that CUT seems to fare marginally but consistently better than NMP, RP, and EGAL in the utilitarian metric. This is especially so when we consider the average rather than the worst ratios.
We note that NMP rule's fairness constraints also lead to loss of utilitarian welfare. Fain et al. (2016) show that on certain real-world participatory budgeting datasets, core fair outcomes often coincide with welfare maximizing ones. Since the objective of EGAL is diametrically opposed to utilitarian objectives, it is not surprising that EGAL fares the worst in the utilitarian metric among the rules we consider. In particular its worst case ratios drop rapidly as we increase the number of agents and outcomes. Table 1 : Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under the NMP rule to maximum utilitarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and # outcomes. Table 2 : Average ratio of utilitarian welfare the NMP rule to maximum utilitarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and # outcomes. Table 3 : Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under EGAL to maximum utilitarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and # outcomes. Table 5 : Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under CUT to maximum utilitarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and # outcomes. Table 7 : Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under RP to maximum utilitarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and # outcomes. Table 8 : Average ratio of utilitarian welfare under RP to maximum utilitarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and # outcomes.
10 Conclusion and Open Questions 1) We compared the relative merits of some well-known rules (EGAL, RP, NMP) and of an (essentially) new one (CUT), for the model of probabilistic/fractional voting under dichotomous preferences. We did so by taking a more nuanced and fine-grained approach to standard concepts such as strategyproofness, participation incentives, and welfare guarantees, of which we introduced new versions, both weaker and stronger than the existing ones. Some of the results are summarised in Table 9 . Table 9 : Properties satisfied by rules under dichotomous preferences.
The two rules that are especially desirable in the instances where protection of minorities and participation concerns matter most are CUT and NMP. The Conditional Utilitarian rule is strongly incentive compatible, but in extreme cases it may be severely inefficient. The Nash Max Product rule is efficient and gives much better guarantees to groups of agents than CUT, but it fails even the weak form of strategyproofness where outcomes are excludable.
2) Our results also identify two especially interesting open questions. We know from Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) that Efficiency, Individual Fair Share and Strategyproofness are incompatible. If we are content to achieve only the excludable version of Strategyproofness, this incompatibility disappears, and the Egalitarian rule is an example. The unpalatable feature of this rule is that it pays no attention to clones (subgroups of agents with identical preferences) hence offers no protection to sizable minorities. But can a rule combine Efficiency, Excludable Strategyproofness and Strict Participation; or Efficiency, Excludable Strategyproofness and Unanimous Fair Share? Such a rule would be a serious new contender in our fair mixing model.
3) Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) defined, and Bogomolnaia et al. (2002) studied, a family of welfarist rules directly borrowed from classical social choice theory. 
This maximization has a unique solution in Φ(M ). The NMP rule is of course a paramount example. All h-rules are efficient, and by mimicking Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 3, we see that they satisfy PART * provided h ′ (0) = ∞. They satisfy (resp. fail) IFS if h is at least as concave as (resp. less concave than) the log function; but NMP is the only h-rule meeting UFS (these two facts are already proven in Bogomolnaia et al. (2002) ). Finally all h-rules fail EXSP and only NMP meets DEC. Thus they don't add much to our axiomatic discussion.
However, once we observe that the EGAL and UTIL rules are the two end points of the family of h-rules 7 the following intriguing facts emerges: most h-rules meet PART * but neither EGAL nor UTIL does; EGAL and UTIL meet EXSP, but none of the h-rules does. In this case, The outcome of NMP is 0.4179621510380684, 0.1389580435629242, 0.22150747720884034, 0.22157232819017458). Note that the misreporting agent gets more utility (equivalently more probability for outcome a by additionally liking b).
A formal construction
We fix N and A and describe a profile u ∈ Ω by the vector (n S ) S∈2 A ∅ of non negative integers, where n S is the number of agents i with like-set L i = S. Because f nsh is Anonymous, this is all we need to describe f nsh (u). If z ∈ ∆(A) has full support (z a > 0 for all a), it is (uniquely) selected at u if and only if the gradient of z → ϕ(z) = N ln(z Li ) is parallel at z to 1 A . Write Θ(a) for the set of subsets of A containing a, then we have 
Thus f nsh (u) = z holds iff the right hand equation above holds for |A| − 1 independent pairs a, b.
Constructing an example violating SP + We note first that SP + is equivalent to the following property: if at profile u a set of K agents have identical preferences S, and u ′ is obtained from u when they all report instead S ∪ T , ceteris paribus, then the total weight of S decreases weakly from u to u ′ . Indeed by SP + , when our K agents misreport their preferences one at a time, the weight of a must decrease weakly at each step. 
